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The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States

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Abstract
While previously polarization was primarily seen only in issue-based terms, a new type of division has emerged in the mass public in recent years: Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party. Democrats and Republicans both say that the other party’s members are hypocritical, selfish, and closed-minded, and they are unwilling to socialize across party lines. This phenomenon of animosity between the parties is known as affective polarization. We trace its origins to the power of partisanship as a social identity, and explain the factors that intensify partisan animus. We also explore the consequences of affective polarization, highlighting how partisan affect influences attitudes and behaviors well outside the political sphere. Finally, we discuss strategies that might mitigate partisan discord and conclude with suggestions for future work.
INTRODUCTION

America, we are told, is a divided nation. What does this mean? Political elites—particularly members of Congress—increasingly disagree on policy issues (McCarty et al. 2006), though there is still an active debate about whether the same is true of the mass public (Abramowitz & Saunders 2008, Fiorina et al. 2008). But regardless of how divided Americans may be on the issues, a new type of division has emerged in the mass public in recent years: Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party.

Democrats and Republicans both say that the other party’s members are hypocritical, selfish, and closed-minded, and they are unwilling to socialize across party lines, or even to partner with opponents in a variety of other activities. This phenomenon of animosity between the parties is known as affective polarization.

We trace the origins of affective polarization to the power of partisanship as a social identity, and explain the factors that intensify partisan animus. We also explore the consequences of affective polarization, highlighting how partisan affect influences attitudes and behaviors well outside the political sphere. Finally, we discuss strategies that might mitigate partisan discord, and conclude with some suggestions for future work.

AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: AN OUTGROWTH OF PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY

*Homo sapiens* is a social species; group affiliation is essential to our sense of self. Individuals instinctively think of themselves as representing broad socioeconomic and cultural categories rather than as distinctive packages of traits (Brewer 1991, Tajfel 1978). Political parties often form along these lines precisely because group identities are so stable and significant (Lipset & Rokkan 1967).

In the United States, partisanship means identifying with the Democrat group or the Republican group (Green et al. 2002, Huddy et al. 2015). A host of behavioral consequences flow from that identification. When we identify with a political party, we instinctively divide up the world into an in group (our own party) and an out group (the opposing party, or out party; see Tajfel & Turner 1979). A vast literature in social psychology demonstrates that any such in-group/out-group distinction, even one based on the most trivial of shared characteristics, triggers both positive feelings for the in group and negative evaluations of the out group (see, e.g., Billig & Tajfel 1973). The more salient the group to the sense of personal identity, the stronger these intergroup divisions (Gaertner et al. 1993).

Partisanship is a particularly salient and powerful identifier for two main reasons. First, it is acquired at a young age and rarely changes over the life cycle, notwithstanding significant shifts in personal circumstances (Sears 1975). Second, political campaigns—the formal occasions for expressing one’s partisan identity—recur frequently and last for many months (or even years) in the contemporary United States. Indeed, some even argue that modern governance is effectively always about the next campaign (Lee 2016), meaning that individuals constantly receive partisan cues from elites. It is no surprise, therefore, that ordinary Americans see the political world through a partisan prism.

From a social identity perspective, affective polarization is a natural offshoot of this sense of partisan group identity: “the tendency of people identifying as Republicans or Democrats to view opposing partisans negatively and copartisans positively” (Iyengar & Westwood 2015, p. 691). However, changes in the contemporary political and media environment have exacerbated the divide in recent years, as we explain below.
Our conceptualization of polarization as rooted in affect and identity stands in contrast to a long tradition in political science of studying polarization as the difference between the policy positions of Democrats and Republicans (Fiorina et al. 2005). Indeed, there is ongoing scholarly disagreement over the extent of such ideological polarization. Some scholars argue that the mass public has polarized on the issues, citing a decline in the number of ideological moderates and a near doubling of the average distance between the ideological self-placement of nonactivist Democrats and Republicans between 1972 and 2004 (Abramowitz & Saunders 2008). Others dispute this description of the masses, maintaining that the median citizen remains a centrist rather than an extremist on most issues (Fiorina et al. 2008).

We do not take a position on this ongoing debate. Rather, we argue that affective polarization is largely distinct from the ideological divide, and that extremity in issue opinions is not a necessary condition for affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2012, Mason 2015). Indeed, in some settings, affective polarization can increase while ideological divisions shrink (Levendusky & Malhotra 2016a). While there are important connections between affective and ideological polarization (Abramowitz & Webster 2016), to which we return below, they are theoretically and empirically distinct concepts. In this article, we focus exclusively on the affective dimension of polarization.

HOW DO WE MEASURE AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION?

Scholars have used three main classes of techniques to measure affective polarization: survey self-reports of partisan affect, implicit or subconscious tests of partisan bias, and behavioral measures of interpersonal trust and group favoritism or discrimination based on partisan cues.

Survey Self-Reports

Survey self-reports are the most basic and widely used measure of affective polarization in the literature. While scholars have relied on several different survey items, the most central is the “feeling thermometer” question from the American National Election Study (ANES) time series. The feeling thermometer was originally created as a “neutrally worded means of eliciting responses to a wide variety of candidates” (Weisberg & Rusk 1970, p. 1168) but has become the primary vehicle for measuring affect toward a wide range of groups in the electorate. Typically, respondents are asked to rate Democrats and Republicans (or the Democratic and Republican Parties) on a 101-point scale ranging from cold (0) to warm (100). Affective polarization is then computed as the difference between the score given to the party of the respondent and the score given to the opposing party, which we also refer to as the out party. In the ANES time series (see Figure 1), this measure shows a significant increase in affective polarization since 1980, rising from 22.64 degrees in 1978 to 40.87 degrees in 2016 (Iyengar et al. 2012). It is particularly noteworthy that (a) the change is not that people like their own party more over time; rather, there is an increase in out-party animus, especially in recent years, and (b) affective polarization actually decreased between 2012 and 2016. Other over-time measures of partisan affect show similar patterns (e.g., Pew Research Center 2017).

Although the feeling thermometer is the workhorse survey item, scholars have also adopted alternative measures. Levendusky (2018a) and Levendusky & Malhotra (2016a) use trait ratings of party supporters to measure affective discord: Are they intelligent, open-minded, and generous, or hypocritical, selfish, and mean (see also Garrett et al. 2014, Iyengar et al. 2012)? Levendusky & Malhotra (2016a) also count the number of things people can bring to mind that they like and dislike about the parties as a quasi-behavioral measure. Other scholars have substituted the extent...
Using data from the American National Election Study (ANES), the figure shows trends in average feeling for the party participants identify with (in-party) and for the opposing party (out-party). In-party feeling (green line) has remained high over the period plotted, though it has decreased slightly in recent years. Out-party feeling (purple line) has decreased dramatically, especially after 1990. We also plot affective polarization (gray line)—the difference between mean in-party feeling and mean out-party feeling—which shows a significant increase over time (Iyengar et al. 2012), mainly due to an increase in animus against the out-party. However, it is worth noting that affective polarization actually decreased between 2012 and 2016 due to decreases in feeling toward the in-party.

Alessobtrusivemeasureofpartisanaffectissocialdistance, the extent to which individuals feel comfortable interacting with out-group members in various settings. If partisanship is an important social identity in its own right, partisans should be averse to entering into close interpersonal relations with their opponents. Iyengar et al. (2012) show that Americans have become increasingly averse to the prospect of their child marrying someone from the opposing party. In 1960, only 4–5% were upset with their child marrying someone from the out party, but that figure had jumped to one-third of Democrats and one-half of Republicans by 2010 (Iyengar et al. 2012, pp. 416–18). However, Klar et al. (2018) show that social distance measures conflate partisan animus and a dislike of politics: When people are asked about their child marrying someone from the opposing party, they assume that partisanship is a salient part of that person’s identity. When respondents are told prior to the question that the potential spouse is largely apolitical, their opposition falls sharply. Similarly, their opposition to same-party marriage rises when they are told the person frequently discusses politics. This suggests that part of the opposition to interparty marriage (and other types of social distance) may stem from the assumption that people labeled Republicans and Democrats are the extremists portrayed in the media (Levendusky & Malhotra 2016a), rather than their more typical apolitical brethren. Alternatively, the finding may reflect the well-known association between politics and disagreement; most people prefer to be in agreeable relationships. However, the critique by Klar et al. (2018) could not explain why these social distance measures have changed over time, unless the desire for political agreement has increased. If this is the case, it would also indicate a rise in affective polarization. Understanding the precise limitations of social distance measures is an important topic for future research.
Implicit Measures

A major limitation to survey-based indicators of partisan affect is that they are reactive and susceptible to intentional exaggeration/suppression based on normative pressures. Unlike race, gender, and other social divides where group-related attitudes and behaviors are subject to social norms (Maccoby & Maccoby 1954), there are no corresponding pressures to temper disapproval of political opponents. If anything, the rhetoric and actions of political leaders demonstrate that hostility directed at the opposition is acceptable and often appropriate. Implicit measures are known to be much harder to manipulate than explicit self-reports; they are therefore more valid and less susceptible to impression management (Boysen et al. 2006).

Iyengar & Westwood (2015) developed an Implicit Association Test to document unconscious partisan bias, based on the brief version of the race IAT. Their results showed that implicit bias is ingrained; approximately 70% of Democrats and Republicans show a bias in favor of their party. Interestingly, implicit bias is less pronounced than explicit bias as measured through survey questions; 91% of Republicans and 75% of Democrats in the same study explicitly evaluated their party more favorably.

To place the results from their party IAT in context, Iyengar & Westwood (2015) also administered the race IAT. Relative to implicit racial bias, implicit partisan bias is more widespread. The difference in the D-score—the operational indicator of implicit bias—across the party divide was 0.50, while the corresponding difference in implicit racial bias across the racial divide was only 0.18 (see also Theodoridis 2017 for an application of implicit measures to the study of partisanship). Ryan (2017) shows that when explicit political preferences are weak, these underlying implicit preferences drive political decision making.

Behavioral Measures

Of course, one can also critique measures of implicit attitudes, especially on the grounds that they are weak predictors of relevant behaviors. Given the limits of the attitudinal approach, scholars have turned to behavioral manifestations of partisan animus in both lab and naturalistic settings. Iyengar & Westwood (2015) and Carlin & Love (2013) introduce economic games as a platform for documenting the extent to which partisans are willing to endow or withhold financial rewards from players who either share or do not share their partisan affiliation. Using both the trust game and the dictator game, this work measures partisan bias as the difference between financial allocations to copartisans and opposing partisans. Results show that copartisans consistently receive a bonus while opposing partisans are subject to a financial penalty.

Iyengar & Westwood (2015) further document the extent of affective polarization by comparing the effects of partisan and racial cues in nonpolitical settings. In one study, they asked participants to select one of two candidates for a college scholarship. The candidates—both high school students—had similar academic credentials, but differed in their ethnicity (white or African American) or party (Democrat or Republican). The results indicated little racial bias; whites, in fact, preferred the African American applicant (55.8%). But 79.2% of Democrats picked the Democratic applicant and 80% of Republicans picked the Republican applicant. These results held even when the out-party candidate had a significantly higher grade point average (4.0 versus 3.5); the probability of a partisan selecting the more qualified out-party candidate was never above 30%.

The scholarship study showed that partisan cues exert strong leverage over nonpolitical attitudes. This phenomenon of affective spillover has been documented in a variety of domains including evaluations of job applicants (Gift & Gift 2015), dating behavior (Huber & Malhotra 2017), and online labor markets (McConnell et al. 2018). This work consistently shows that partisanship
has bled into the nonpolitical sphere, driving ordinary citizens to reward copartisans and penalize opposing partisans, a point to which we return below.

A major limitation of implicit and behavioral measures is the lack of historical survey data. Despite the limitations of feeling thermometers and social distance measures, an advantage is that they have been asked for long periods of time, allowing researchers to document changes over time.

Regardless of measurement technique, the literature consistently documents an affective and behavioral divide between the in party and the out party. Further measurement exercises show that while affective polarization predicts both political and private behavior, it has yet to rise to the level of overt discrimination as conceptualized in social psychology (Lelkes & Westwood 2017). Understanding the limits to affective polarization, and what constrains these sentiments, therefore, is another important realm for future study.

ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION

Several features of the contemporary environment have exacerbated partisans’ proclivity to divide the world into a liked in group (one’s own party) and a disliked out group (the opposing party). First, in the last 50 years, the percentage of sorted partisans, i.e., partisans who identify with the party most closely reflecting their ideology, has steadily increased (Levendusky 2009). When most Democrats are liberals and most Republicans are conservatives, copartisans are less likely to encounter conflicting political ideas and identities (Roccas & Brewer 2002) and are more likely to see nonidentifiers as socially distant. Sorting likely leads people to perceive both opposing partisans and copartisans as more extreme than they really are, with misperceptions about opposing partisans being more acute (Levendusky & Malhotra 2016b). As partisan and ideological identities became increasingly aligned, other salient social identities, including race and religion, also converged with partisanship. White evangelicals, for instance, are overwhelmingly Republican today, and African Americans overwhelmingly identify as Democrats. This decline of cross-cutting identities is at the root of affective polarization, according to Mason (2015, 2018b). She has shown that those with consistent partisan and ideological identities became more hostile toward the out party without necessarily changing their ideological positions, and those who have aligned religious, racial, and partisan identities react more emotionally to information that threatens their partisan identities or issue stances. In essence, sorting has made it much easier for partisans to make generalized inferences about the opposing side, even if those inferences are inaccurate.

While reinforcing social identities seem to be a key factor explaining affective polarization, other work finds that ideological polarization also impacts affective polarization (Rogowski & Sutherland 2016, Bougher 2017). Observational time-series and panel data indicate that increasing ideological extremity and constraint are both associated with stronger partisan affect (Bougher 2017), and experimental work that manipulates the degree to which a candidate is perceived as liberal or conservative also impacts affective polarization (Rogowski & Sutherland 2016, Webster & Abramowitz 2017).

The high-choice media environment and the proliferation of partisan news outlets are frequently blamed for the current polarized environment (e.g., Lelkes et al. 2017). The argument is that partisan news activates partisan identities and consequent feelings toward the political parties. One feature of any social identity is that, in order to fit in with the group, identifiers must adopt the attitudes of prototypical in-group members (Hogg 2001). Partisan outlets—many of which depict the opposing party in harsh terms, often comparing out partisans to Nazis and Communists (Berry & Sobieraj 2014) and focusing disproportionately on out-party scandals (real or imagined)—inculcate hostility toward the out group (Puglisi & Snyder 2011).
Further, the lack of balanced content in these outlets may persuade viewers to adopt extreme ideological positions (Levendusky 2013), which, in turn, increases affective polarization (Rogowsky & Sutherland 2016, Webster & Abramowitz 2017). While both survey and experimental research support this hypothesis (Stroud 2010, Levendusky 2013), the precise mechanism is unclear because the treatment is typically exposure to an outlet or cable news show, making it difficult to tease apart the effects of exposure to extreme policy positions, the priming of partisanship, or the cultivation of hostility toward the other side.

It is far from clear, however, that partisan news actually causes affective polarization. First, those who are the most polarized are, of course, more motivated to watch partisan news (Arceneaux & Johnson 2013). Arguably, therefore, partisan news has little impact on polarization. Levendusky (2013), however, finds that exposure to partisan news makes those with extreme attitudes even more extreme.

A second mitigating factor is that partisans may not have a clear preference for information that is consistent with their ideology or identity. While some studies have found evidence of selective exposure to partisan information (e.g., Stroud 2011), others find that Americans typically select ideologically neutral content (e.g., Gentzkow & Shapiro 2011). So even if partisan news or other identity-consistent information heightens affective polarization, few people may actually limit their exposure to sources representing a particular identity or ideology (see also Bakshy et al. 2015).

The relationship between internet access, a major route to partisan media, and affective polarization is similarly contested. Using state Right-of-Way laws as an instrument for internet access, Lelkes et al. (2017) find a small positive relationship between Internet access and affective polarization. In contrast, Boxell et al. (2017) find that affective polarization has increased the most among those least likely to use social media and the internet. Given these inconsistent results, it is too early to conclude that internet usage (and the availability of a wider array of information) plays a definite role in the growth of affective polarization.

While the high-choice media environment of cable television and the internet allows those uninterested in politics to ignore it, exposure to partisan news can occur in other ways. First, as people spend more time online and on social network sites, they are more likely to be inadvertently exposed to polarizing content by others in their network (Bakshy et al. 2015). Additionally, people may be exposed to partisan news content indirectly through discussion with peers. Druckman et al. (2018) randomly assigned subjects to watch partisan media and later participate in discussions with those who did not watch the stimuli. Those in groups that contained people who watched the stimuli were significantly more (ideologically) polarized than those who were not in such groups. This result suggests that partisan media—and other related outlets—may play a more significant role than initially thought because their messages can be amplified by social networks and two-step communication flows.

Partisan commentary is not the only type of media content that can polarize Americans. First, the mainstream media has increasingly focused on polarization. According to one content analysis, there are roughly 20% more stories about polarization in America today than there were at the turn of the twenty-first century (Levendusky & Malhotra 2016a). Experimental evidence suggests that coverage of polarization increases affective polarization but decreases ideological polarization (Levendusky & Malhotra 2016a).

Political campaigns also exacerbate partisan tensions (Sood & Iyengar 2016). Across recent election cycles, people were 50–150% more affectively polarized by election day than they were a year earlier. Additionally, by identifying people who live in the designated market area of a neighboring battleground state, Sood & Iyengar (2016) show that political advertisements, and especially negative advertising, have particularly strong effects on affective polarization (see also...
Political campaigns may heighten tensions in a number of ways. For instance, campaigns make partisanship more salient (Michelitch & Utych 2018) and regularly run ads that portray the other side as an existential threat.

Finally, increasingly homogeneous online and offline interpersonal networks may be contributing to affective polarization. As partisans become more isolated from each other (Gimpel & Hui 2015) in their real and virtual lives, they are more likely to encounter only like-minded voices, further exacerbating polarization. While provocative, and certainly part of the popular discourse, the scholarly evidence on social homophily is mixed. For one thing, there is little evidence that people are increasingly living in partisan enclaves (Mummolo & Nall 2017). However, it is clear that families have become more politically homogeneous. Spousal agreement on party affiliation now exceeds 80%, with parent–offspring agreement at 75%, both figures representing large increases in family agreement since the 1960s (Iyengar et al. 2018). In the case of online behavior, as we noted above, the first analysis of partisan segregation in the audience for online news (Gentzkow & Shapiro 2011) showed that most Americans encountered diverse points of view. More recent work, however, suggests that the polarization of online news audiences has increased, especially with respect to election-related news. All told, therefore, it is premature to reach any firm conclusions about the role of “echo chambers,” either in person or online, as causes of affective polarization.

THE NONPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION

One major concern is that partisan animus might spill over and affect behaviors and attitudes outside the political realm. It is one thing if partisan disagreements are confined to political contestation, but quite another if everyday interactions and life choices are compromised by politics.

For instance, does partisanship affect the social relations we seek to enter into, such as friendships, romantic relationships, or marriages? Since partisanship increasingly signals core values and worldview, it is unsurprising that partisanship is used to screen social partners. People may also perceive copartisans to be more physically attractive (Nicholson et al. 2016). Longitudinal survey data have shown that people self-report that they are less comfortable with social relationships with out partisans. According to Iyengar et al. (2012), the percentage of Americans who would be somewhat or very unhappy if their child married someone of the opposite party has increased by about 35 percentage points over the last 50 years, with Republicans especially sensitive to cross-party marriage. These increases are much larger in the United States than in a similar advanced democracy, the United Kingdom. And these preferences appear substantively larger than apolitical benchmarks, such as the 17–20% of people who would not want their child marrying a fan of an opposing baseball team (Hersh 2016). Behavioral data from smartphone activity confirms that Americans are averse to cross-partisan dialogue within their families, especially in the wake of the 2016 election (Chen & Rohla 2018).

Although people may state that they do not want to enter into relationships with people of the opposing party, does their behavior match their self-reports? Observational survey data have long found that marriages are much more politically homogeneous than one would expect by chance (Stoker 1995). This finding has been validated in large voter files, which show that 80.5%

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1 However, Huber & Malhotra (2017) run similar experiments to Nicholson et al. (2016), including more contextual information along the lines of a conjoint design, and find no effect of shared partisanship on perceived attractiveness.
of married couples share a party identification (Iyengar et al. 2018), and that selection rather than convergence over time explains spousal agreement.2

Of course, any data collected after people have married is of limited utility for assessing whether people prefer to engage in romantic relationships with people of the opposing party. This is because homophily can be induced by various factors unrelated to selection: postmarriage conversion, the influence of shared environment, or structural features of the available partner pool. As a result, some recent research has attempted to use data from online dating websites to assess whether political homophily in relationships is due to selection based on political profiles. Huber & Malhotra (2017) leveraged data from an online dating website where they have access to the profile characteristics of daters as well as their messaging behavior. They find that partisan matching increases the likelihood of a dyad exchanging messages by 9.5%. To put that finding into context, analogous figures for dating pairs matched by level of education and religion are 10.6% and 50.0%, respectively. On the one hand, these substantive effects might be smaller than survey data would imply. On the other hand, partisan sorting seems to be on a par with socioeconomic status, long considered the major basis for the selection of long-term partners. Huber & Malhotra (2017) corroborate this finding with data from a survey experiment where partisanship is randomly manipulated in the dating profiles.

The findings of Huber & Malhotra (2017) appear to conflict with other data from public online dating profiles (Klofstad et al. 2013). Although these studies do not have access to the messaging behavior going on behind the scenes, they find that online daters usually do not advertise their political preferences, which would seem inconsistent with the idea of people actively selecting on this information. However, dating behavior may be changing. The dating website eHarmony reported that dating profiles typically did not report political affiliation prior to the 2016 presidential election (24.6% of women and 16.5% of men). After the 2016 presidential election, these figures increased to 68% and 47%, respectively (Kiefer 2017), suggesting that in the wake of that divisive election, a sea change may be underway.

If the thought of a romantic relationship with an opposing partisan is a bridge too far, one might ask whether people are more tolerant in friendship. Survey data from the Pew Research Center (2017) suggest this is unlikely; about 64% of Democrats and 55% of Republicans say they have “just a few” or “no” close friends who are from the other political party. Huber & Malhotra (2017) also find in their survey experiment that discordant partisanship decreases people’s likelihood of being friends with someone even if they do not want a romantic relationship. Chopik & Motyl (2016) find that living in a politically incongruent area made it more difficult for people to form friendships. Behavioral data seem to confirm that people seek to hide their partisanship from peers when they are living in a politically discordant location. Using data on political donations, Perez-Truglia & Cruces (2017) find that people signal their conformity to opposite-party peers via donations, perhaps out of fear of social reprisal. Finally, Facebook data show that the median proportion of friendship groups that are ideologically discordant is only about 20% (Bakshy et al. 2015).

If people seek to socialize with people they are likely to agree with politically, it stands to reason that they may choose to locate themselves near like-minded individuals. Indeed, survey data suggest that people self-report desiring to move to locations with fellow partisans (Gimpel & Hui 2015). The idea of residential sorting based on partisanship was first popularized by Bishop (2009), who reported descriptive statistics showing that counties had become more politically

2Using the Catalyst subsample, Hersh & Ghitza (2019) find somewhat lower spousal agreement (70%), but this is still significantly higher than chance alone would predict.
homogeneous over time. However, Klinkner (2004) challenged much of this data analysis by showing that residential sorting has not increased significantly over the past few decades when one analyzes party registration data instead of presidential vote returns. Further, in contrast to Gimpel & Hui (2015), Mummolo & Nall (2017) show that revealed preferences concerning place of residence diverge from stated preferences. Although people claim they would like to move to a more politically compatible area (e.g., Democrats claiming they would move to Canada following Bush’s 2004 reelection), mobility data suggest that people are not moving for political reasons, largely because nonpolitical factors—such as the quality of the public schools—dominate the decisions of Democrats and Republicans alike.

Thus far, we have mainly explored if partisanship spills over into people’s social interactions. But can partisanship also distort economic behavior? Michelitch’s (2015) pioneering work in this area found that Ghanaian taxi drivers accept lower prices from copartisans and demand higher prices from counter-partisans. Specifically, noncoethnic counter-partisans pay 16% more and noncoethnic copartisans 6% more in taxi fares than coethnic copartisans, suggesting an interaction between ethnicity and partisanship. McConnell et al. (2018) conducted a field experiment in the United States in which people were provided the opportunity to buy a heavily discounted gift card. Some buyers were assigned to conditions in which they learned that the seller was either a copartisan or counter-partisan. The authors found no evidence of out-group animus; the purchasing rate remained stable across same-party and opposite-party sellers. However, interacting with a copartisan seller nearly doubled the purchasing price of the gift card. The effects were even larger among strong partisans. Panagopoulos et al. (2016), in contrast, find evidence of out-group animus: 15–20% of participants in their study were less willing to accept a gift card from a company that gives PAC donations to the opposing party. While Panagopoulos et al. (2016) observe larger effect sizes than McConnell et al. (2018), that could be because their study took place within the less-natural context of a survey experiment. Indeed, in Panagopoulos et al.’s (2016) replication study done in the field, the effect sizes fell to about five percentage points.

In addition to product markets, partisanship can distort labor markets. Using an audit design, Gift & Gift (2015) mailed out resumes signaling job applicants’ partisan affiliation in a heavily Democratic area and a heavily Republican area. They find that in the Democratic county, Democratic resumes were 2.4 percentage points more likely to receive a callback than Republican resumes; the partisan preference for Republican resumes in the Republican county was 5.6 percentage points. Whereas Gift & Gift (2015) examine employer preferences, McConnell et al. (2018) examine the other side of the labor market and study how partisanship affects employee behavior. The researchers hired workers to complete an online editing task and subtly signaled the partisan identification of the employer. Unlike Gift & Gift (2015), they mainly find evidence of in-group affinity as opposed to out-group prejudice. The only significant differences occurred between the copartisan condition and the control group. People exhibited a willingness to accept lower compensation (by 6.5%) from a partisan-congruent employer. At the same time, they performed lower-quality work and exhibited less effort. Although the mechanism for this performance deficit is unclear, one possibility is that they perceived the employer to be of higher quality and therefore less likely to make mistakes.

In addition to affecting economic decisions, partisanship colors how people perceive the state of the economy. A seminal finding in political behavior research is that people tend to believe that economic outcomes (e.g., GDP growth, unemployment rate) are more favorable when their party is in the White House and more unfavorable when it is out (Bartels 2002). These perceptual biases seem most pronounced when the actual state of the economy is ambiguous (Healy & Malhotra 2013). These findings have recently been challenged on the grounds that survey responses are expressive cheap talk (Bullock et al. 2015, Prior et al. 2015). The partisan gap in economic
perceptions narrows—but does not disappear—when survey respondents are financially incentivized to provide accurate answers about the state of the economy. Of course, one concern about these findings is that voting, like the typical survey response, is an expressive act, not an incentivized one (see also Berinsky 2018). Moreover, the correlation between vote choice and nonincentivized economic beliefs outstrips the correlation between vote choice and incentivized beliefs, suggesting that paying survey participants to be honest only results in an expensive version of cheap talk.

Given the concerns over the motives of survey respondents, scholars have used research designs less subject to partisan cheerleading. For instance, Gerber & Huber (2010) find that when party control of Congress switches, consumer behavior changes, and it changes along party lines, in anticipation of changes in the economy. After the Democrats took over Congress in 2006, strong Democrats showed a 12.8% increase in holiday spending and a 30.5% increase in vacation spending relative to strong Republicans. In an earlier study, Gerber & Huber (2009) used data from county tax receipts to estimate that a county that moves from 50% Democratic to 65% Democratic undergoes an increase in consumption 0.9% higher following a Democratic presidential victory compared with a Republican presidential victory. However, these empirical results have recently been challenged (McGrath 2017), and the relationship between partisanship and economic perceptions remains an important area of scholarly inquiry.

Partisanship may spill over into professional decisions as well. In medicine, Hersh & Goldenberg (2016) find that Republican and Democratic physicians give different advice to patients on politicized health issues such as abortion, but not on apolitical health topics. On the patient side, Lerman et al. (2017) leverage longitudinal data and find that Republicans were less likely than Democrats to enroll in health insurance exchanges set up by the Affordable Care Act.

While we have focused here on the nonpolitical consequences of affective polarization and partisan animus, there is also the question of political consequences. Interestingly, little has been written on this topic, as most studies have focused on the more surprising apolitical ramifications discussed above. There are two important exceptions, however. First, there is evidence that affective polarization and out-party animus fuel political activity: Individuals’ dislike for the opposing party encourages them to participate more in politics (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018). Second, Hetherington & Rudolph (2015) show that affective polarization undermines trust on the part of the party that is out of power, and hence makes governing more complex.

Research into the consequences of affective polarization is only beginning. More research is needed to understand how these factors play out in different political contexts. For instance, do increases in affective polarization among the mass public increase partisan discord among elites? More generally, does affective polarization threaten to undermine the very mechanisms of electoral accountability through which elected officials can be punished for misdeeds? Were Republicans in Alabama so hostile toward Democratic Senate candidate Doug Jones in 2017 that almost all of them voted for a candidate accused of multiple sexual indiscretions? More research is needed to fully flesh out these behaviors.

DECREASING AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION

What, if anything, can be done to ameliorate affective polarization? While efforts here are at best nascent, several approaches have shown promise. All of them work to reduce the biases generated by partisanship’s division of the world into an in group and an out group. Hence, some work has focused on making partisan identities less salient or making other identities more salient.

First, scholars have shown that correcting misperceptions about party supporters reduces animus toward the other side (Ahler & Sood 2018). The modal member of both parties is a
middle-aged, white, nonevangelical Christian, but this is not the image most people carry around in their heads when they think about Democrats and Republicans. Instead, most people think in terms of partisan stereotypes: Democrats are urban minorities and young people, Republicans are older, wealthy, or evangelical Christians. Consequently, when the typical American is asked about the composition of the parties, she tends to dramatically overreport the prevalence of partisan-stereotypical groups. Only about 11% of Democrats belong to a labor union, but in a large national survey, the average American thought that 39% of Democrats were union members; 44% of Republicans had this perception along with 37% of Democrats. Likewise, while only 2.2% of Republicans earn more than $250,000 per year, the average citizen thought that 38% of Republicans earned that much. Looking across a range of party-stereotypical groups, Ahler & Sood (2018) find that respondents overestimate the prevalence of these groups by 342%. These biases matter because people typically hold negative views toward the other party’s stereotypical groups (see also Levendusky & Malhotra 2016b).

If misperceptions about party composition increase partisan animus, it is possible that correcting them could reduce affective polarization. Happily, this is exactly what scholars find. When Ahler & Sood (2018) correct respondents’ misperceptions, respondents think the other party is less extreme, and affective polarization decreases (i.e., they like the other party more). In essence, people dislike the other party in part because they (inaccurately) perceive it to be quite different from themselves and full of disliked groups. When this error is corrected, and they realize the partisan out-group is more similar to them than they had realized, animus lessens.

A second approach tries to shift the salience of respondents’ partisan identities. Normally, Democrats and Republicans perceive each other as members of a disliked partisan out group. But they are also members of a common group: Americans. If Democrats and Republicans see one another as Americans, rather than partisans, they move from out-group members to in-group ones, and hence group-based partisan animus should fade. Using a set of survey experiments, as well as a natural experiment stemming from the July Fourth holiday, Levendusky (2018a) shows that emphasizing American identity reduces animus toward the other party. For example, in his experimental results, subjects who had had their American identity primed were 25% less likely to rate the other party at 0 degrees on a feeling thermometer scale, and 35% more likely to rate the other party at 50 degrees or higher; there are similar effects for ratings of various traits [see similar results by Carlin & Love (2018) on the killing of Osama bin Laden]. When we bring forward what unites Democrats and Republicans, rather than emphasizing what divides and differentiates them, partisan animus subsides.

More generally, the evidence suggests that making partisanship and politics less salient—and emphasizing other factors—can potentially change behavior as well. Lerman et al. (2017) partnered with an outside organization, Enroll America, to help uninsured individuals obtain health insurance through the federal marketplace. Individuals who went to Enroll America’s website were directed either to the government-run website or to a private website. While the website had no effect on the behavior of Democrats or Independents, it had an enormous effect on Republicans.

1While Ahler & Sood (2018) do a commendable job of reviewing the consequences of such misperceptions, they have less to say about their causes. They offer some initial evidence that those who consume more political news hold more biased beliefs (see their figure 2), suggesting a role for media coverage of the parties. More careful documentation of the sources of these stereotypes will be an important step for future research.

2Similarly, Ahler (2014) shows that when people are explicitly told how ideologically moderate the average American is, respondents also become more moderate; correcting misperceptions can also mitigate ideological polarization. However, Levendusky & Malhotra (2016a) reach different conclusions, using a different operationalization of the treatment.
Republicans assigned to the private website were 20 percentage points more likely to enroll in an insurance plan than Republicans assigned to the government website (see their figure 4 and the discussion on p. 764). Likely because of President Obama’s association with the health insurance exchanges, partisan considerations shaped Republicans’ behavior here. But when they were shown a private website—which obscured the government’s role—they became more willing to enroll. In an era of affective polarization, downplaying politics can help to mitigate partisan divisions.

Both of these approaches represent important contributions to the literature and highlight important pathways to reducing partisan discord in the mass public. But there are two important limitations. First, while both types of efforts appear to be effective, we should not expect reduction of partisan animus to be easy, even in the survey context, where behavior tends to be quite malleable. While some strategies will work, many sensible strategies will fail. For example, Levendusky (2018b) uses a population-based survey experiment to show that priming partisan ambivalence and using self-affirmation techniques—both of which have been shown to reduce similar biases in other contexts—fail to reduce partisan animus. It may be that in the contemporary political era, when partisanship is chronically accessible, only strong primes are able to reduce affective polarization.

Further, it is unclear to what extent treatments that work in a survey experiment (or other controlled settings) work in the messy environment of real-world politics. Even showing that it is possible to reduce affective polarization and discord within the confines of a survey experiment is an important contribution, but another important step for future research will be to demonstrate that such effects can be generalized.

One potentially promising strand of research is to build on the insights of intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew & Tropp 2011) and examine whether constructive engagement between Democrats and Republicans could potentially reduce partisan animus. This is also related to a long tradition of work showing that diverse social networks—which expose individuals to different political points of view—foster tolerance for opposing viewpoints, which should also ameliorate affective polarization (Mutz 2002). For example, several groups have fostered small-scale discussions between ordinary Democrats and Republicans to try to bridge the gap between the parties (Nelson 2015). But there have been no systematic evaluations of these efforts, and it seems questionable whether they are scalable.

**OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS**

In this closing section, we identify future research agendas and offer some thoughts on the political significance of intensified partisan affect in the current era. First, there has been little to no research identifying the mechanisms underlying affective polarization. On the one hand, distaste for opposing partisans could be couched in raw, reflexive emotion. This could result in extreme political responses based on blind hatred. However, psychologists have long suggested that affect has informational content, so heightened affective polarization may also lead to more considered responses to both in and out groups. For instance, the aversion to economic transactions with opposing partisans may stem not from a visceral emotional response but from a perception that opponents are untrustworthy. This is akin to the distinction in the economics literature between animus and statistical discrimination. Of course, existing research has noted that people’s stereotypes of opposing partisans’ traits are inaccurate (in terms of both means and variances), so distinguishing between these mechanisms seems important.

Second, the literature has yet to specify the conditions under which partisans are motivated by either in-group favoritism or out-group animosity. Although social psychologists studying group conflict have generally concluded that in-group affection is the dominant force, the domain of
politics might be distinctive. There is ample evidence that political judgment is subject to a negativity bias (Soroka 2014), implying that party polarization is driven by out-group hostility. However, there is also evidence that in some situations, partisan bias is prompted more by in-group love (Lelkes & Westwood 2017). One plausible hypothesis is that the precise mix of in- and out-group sentiment will depend on individuals’ prior information and how they update beliefs based on exposure to new information. For instance, in experimental work by McConnell et al. (2018), consumers exhibited in-group favoritism toward copartisan sellers but not out-group animus toward opposite-party sellers. Perhaps this is because the experimental participants had no prior relationship with the seller. If people have underlying distrust of unknown sellers, then they can only update in the positive direction, meaning that we should expect in-group love but not out-group dislike. On the other hand, when people respond to a more well-known brand with which they have had a positive, previous relationship, they are able to update negatively but not positively. Therefore, they may be more likely to exhibit out-group animus in response to partisan information (as in Panagopoulos et al. 2016). It is also possible that the role of in groups and out groups in decision making is task dependent. Social psychologists have suggested that contextual effects such as competition and threat alter the degree to which people punish opponents or reward team members (Brewer 1999). Future research can more explicitly incorporate updating into experimental designs intended to identify the relative contributions of in- and out-group sentiment to affective polarization.

As a third agenda item, we encourage researchers to explore the role of sorting as a potential mediator of affective polarization. To the extent that the alignment of ideology and partisanship exacerbates polarization, sorted partisans should elicit a stronger outpouring of either in-group favoritism or out-group animus. Yet we know of no work to date that assesses differences in partisans’ affect toward sorted and unsorted copartisans or opponents.

Relatedly, scholars should examine the relative influence of social identities versus ideological sorting on affective polarization. Recent work indicates that while ideological polarization, sorting, and affective polarization are correlated (Rogowski & Sutherland 2016, Bougher 2017, Webster & Abramowitz 2017), the relationship is weak, with sorting accounting for only about 5% of the variance in affective polarization (Lelkes 2018, Mason 2018a). Furthermore, over the past 40 years, affective polarization—as measured by feeling thermometer differences—increased by about the same amount among those who held the most ideologically consistent issue positions as among those who held the least ideologically consistent issue positions (Lelkes 2018). Further complicating any claim that affective polarization is a byproduct of ideological sorting is the possibility that affective polarization may, in turn, increase sorting. The most affectively polarized may be more likely to toe the party line and adopt party policy positions.

Fourth, no research that we are aware of has identified ways in which affective polarization drives both elite and mass ideological polarization. Among elites, we suspect that affective polarization increases support for extremist politicians, or, at least, blinds partisans to the ideological extremity of candidates from their party. For the mass public, we suspect that affective polarization increases partisans’ willingness to conform to their party’s policy positions. Hence, affective polarization may yield extreme politicians, who then send policy cues to their base, exacerbating mass ideological polarization.

Finally, there has been little effort to draw out the connections between the American politics literature on affective polarization and similar literatures in comparative politics (though see Westwood et al. 2017 and Carlin & Love 2018). Comparativists have long recognized the importance of group identity to political behavior and attitudes, even if they have not used the language of social identity theory or affective polarization. A wide variety of findings in the literatures on ethnicity and distributive politics, as well as on political violence, provide important theoretical
and empirical insights for the study of affective polarization. While we lack the space to review this literature here, more work is needed to build bridges between Americanists and comparativists interested in these topics.

In conclusion, we note that increasing affective polarization can have grave ramifications, especially during times of political turmoil. There is a broad similarity between the current state of the Trump administration and the Watergate years, and yet, heightened polarization has altered the political context in important ways. The Watergate scandal was brought to light by investigative news reports that, over time, became widely accepted as credible and eventually resulted in significant erosion of approval of President Nixon among both Democrats and Republicans alike (Lebo & Cassino 2007). In contrast, the current pervasive drip of scandal touching on the Trump administration has done little to weaken President Trump's popularity among Republicans, who accuse the press and investigative bodies of partisan bias (although see Montagnes et al. 2018). Partisanship appears to now compromise the norms and standards we apply to our elected representatives, and even leads partisans to call into question the legitimacy of election results, both of which threaten the very foundations of representative democracy.

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